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Introduction 
 
At first sight the question in my 
title – is Boris Johnson an Individual 
(capital I) – may seem to be a silly one.  
For is not everyone an individual? To say 
that someone is an individual is like saying 
a rose is a flower (as well as being a rose). 
It is to state the blindingly obvious. If so, it 
may seem strange that, to some people, the 
term ‘individual’ can have pejorative 
associations. In his novelistic exploration 
of the conflict between Istanbul-based, 
Westernising secularists and more 
provincial, more traditional muslims in 
modern Turkey, Orhan Pamuk puts these 
words into the mouth of his most fervently 
articulate Islamist, Blue:- 
 
‘There’s a [Turkish word] 
Europhiles very commonly use when they 
denigrate our people [i.e. orthodox 
muslims]: to be a true Westerner, a person 
must first become an individual, and then 
they go on to say that, in Turkey, there are 
no individuals!’(Pamuk  2010, 331). 
 
Boris Johnson is, however, about as far 
away from these Turkish muslims as could 
be imagined. Of course he is an individual, 
in every sense of the term. It is an offense 
to common-sense to suggest otherwise. 
Indeed, it is difficult to think of a modern 
politician who is a bigger ‘personality’ 
than Boris Johnson, or whose career has 
been marked by such shameless self-
promotion. The strategically and self-
consciously witty ‘Boris’ embodies 
individualism, an ideology that has now 
been whole-heartedly adopted by his 
political party, the Conservatives. His 
individualism is both personal and 
ideological. It is both what he is and what 
he believes in. 
Let us take a closer look at his 
‘individualism’. To be sure, in his speech 
and action, Mr Johnson proclaims his 
difference with others of his kind, that is 
with others of that despised breed we call 
politician. He is no technocrat, no mere 
manager; nor is he an over-
professionalised and whip-tamed product 
of the Westminster Bubble. He has 
Hinterland, he has Character, and, if push 
came to shove, he could do Something 
Else (write novels, do more journalism). 
Despite all this, as he sometimes 
acknowledges, he has not quite made it on 
his own. He owes much to his family and 
to the various institutions of which he was 
a part (Eton College, Oxford University, 
the Conservative party, and even the 
Bullingdon Club). In his 2008 campaign 
for the post of Mayor of London, he 
emphasised the diverse parts of his 
background and ancestry, claiming that he 
embodies (in his person) not so much 
‘individualism’ as the ethnic and social 
diversity of London itself.  In other words, 
one could argue that Boris here presented 
himself as being as much dividual as 
individual – in the sense that 
anthropologists now use. This term – 
dividual – has been invented to deal with 
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personhood in Melanesia, which has struck 
anthropological researchers as being quite 
different from personhood in the modern 
West. To quote Dame Marilyn Strathern:- 
 
‘Far from being regarded as unique 
entities, Melanesian persons are as 
dividually as they are individually 
conceived. They contain a generalized 
sociality within. Indeed, persons are 
frequently constructed as the plural and 
composite side of the relationships that 
produced them. The singular person can 
be imagined as a social microcosm’. 
(Strathern1988, 13) 
 
Homer’s Heroes 
 
To Strathern and many other 
anthropologists, there is a sharp divide 
between Western (Euro-American) and 
Melanesian persons. You could, to put it 
crudely, easily draw up a classic 
‘structural’ diagram that would look like 
this:- 
 
 
Where do Homer’s heroes lie on this 
particular divide?  If you believe, as many 
do, that it is in ancient Greece that the 
Individual first Arose, and that ancient 
Greek culture is essentially Western (and 
Rational), and that there is a direct line of 
cultural and intellectual progress that leads 
from the first stirrings of rational thought 
amongst the pre-Socratic philosophers to 
those supremely rational beings, the 
fellows of New College Oxford, then you 
would be likely to place Homer’s heroes 
on the ‘individual’ side of the divide. For 
who could be more self-willed, more 
individual than Achilles or Odysseus, the 
protagonists of the Iliad and the Odyssey 
respectively? And is there a clearer 
authorial or artistic personality than Homer 
himself? 
These issues are not quite as 
straightforward as one might think. 
Homer, his epics and his heroes, have long 
lain on various intellectual and 
chronological boundaries. ‘Homeric’ 
scholars comprise philologists, literary 
critics, historians (e.g. Raaflaub 1998) and 
archaeologists.  The Homeric epics emerge 
in that shadowy no man’s land between 
prehistoric and historic periods we 
sometimes call ‘proto-history’. Everyone 
now accepts that the epics are rooted in a 
tradition of oral poetry, and it is by no 
means clear when and how the Iliad and 
the Odyssey came to be written down and 
so become relatively definitive (and fixed) 
texts. On the one hand there are those who 
adhere to the standard view of the 1960s 
and 1970s – that the Homeric epics 
reached a recognisable form in the years 
just before 700 BC; on the other there is a 
strong argument to the effect that the first 
definitive texts could have been produced 
no earlier than the mid-sixth century BC 
(with changes to the text continuing down 
into Hellenistic times, 3rd to 2nd centuries 
BC). There is moreover an endless and 
inconclusive dispute about where we 
should place ‘the world of Homer’: in the 
Mycenaean world? In the Aegean Bronze 
Age? In the Iron Age of the twelfth to 
eighth centuries BC? In the Archaic 
period, of around 750 to 480 BC? Or 
simply nowhere in time and space outside 
Individual Dividual 
Western (Euro-
American) 
Melanesian (and 
Indian) 
Bounded, 
autonomous 
Fractal, socially 
defined 
Modern Ethnographic 
Rational Subject Irrational Subject 
Historic (literate 
civilisation) 
Prehistoric (oral 
culture) 
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of the poems themselves (see Snodgrass 
1974)?  
The individuality (dividual/ 
individual) of Homer himself has been 
doubted. That is, the idea that Homer was 
an identifiable person, who can be placed 
in time and place, and who (in whatever 
sense, whether orally or in writing) was/is 
the author of the Iliad and the Odyssey. At 
least one Oxford scholar (West 1999) 
thinks that Homer is an invention of the 
sixth century BC, and others (e.g. Nagy 
1995;1997) see ‘Homer’ as much process 
as person. For Nagy and for other scholars, 
‘Homer’ is simply the name we give to 
that concatenation of performances, first 
purely oral and then only partly literate, 
that led, somewhat mysteriously to the 
texts we now have. It should not then 
surprise us that Homeric personhood 
(dividual vs individual) should also have 
arisen as a major issue in recent years. And 
it is none other than Boris Johnson who 
has raised it.   
In an interview with the Guardian 
newspaper in 2011 Boris Johnson was 
asked whether he had found the job of 
being Mayor of London at all difficult. He 
replied with a quotation that obviously 
baffled the reporter:- ‘τέτλαθιδή, κραδίη; 
καὶκύντερον ἄλλοποτ’ ἔτλης,’ (Homer, 
Od, 20: 18). 
Now of course Boris Johnson here 
is showing off – that is displaying his 
individualism. He is, by quoting ancient 
Greek, differentiating himself from the 
general run of (uncultured) politicians (no 
Hinterland, no Character) – who else of his 
tribe could do so? It was not clear that he 
meant to be understood by, of all people, a 
Guardian journalist. Does anyone from the 
Metro-left still know any Greek? All this is 
true, and in keeping with Boris’ public 
character. In this it is easy to forget that the 
quote is also a perfectly sensible reply to 
the question put.  
Roughly and unpoetically 
translated, the quote means ‘bear up, [my] 
heart; once you suffered worse’. The 
context is the Odyssey, where Odysseus is 
disguised as a beggar in his own palace in 
Ithaka, and recalls a worse time, when he 
was in Polyphemos’ cave. Johnson was 
indicating that he had indeed found the job 
of mayor trying – but that he had seen 
worse [κύντερον – kynteron – literally 
‘more dog-like’] – and he mustn’t 
complain. But Boris Johnson is also, if 
inadvertently, drawing attention to one of 
the unusual if distinctive features of 
Homeric speech – the tendency of heroes 
to address not themselves, but their parts 
(heart [kradie], liver [hetor], or chest 
[phrenes in the plural]), and to address 
these parts in the second person. This 
tendency was once a hot topic in Classical 
studies. Is this form of words merely a 
façon de parler, a form of speech, with no 
further significance? Or does it indicate a 
more radical difference between Homer’s 
heroes and modern-day individuals? Did 
Homeric heroes have a proper sense of 
self? Did they talk either about their soul 
or their body? The distinguished German 
classical scholar Bruno Snell thought not 
(Snell 1975, 17; cf Snell 1953). For Snell, 
Homeric Greeks lacked a sense of the 
‘whole’ person, and in this early stage the 
later word for body (soma) refers 
exclusively to corpses. Moreover Snell 
saw representations of bodies in the 
Geometric period (that is, bodies in 
Geometric art) as being not bodies at all, 
but assemblages of parts. 
What Snell was saying is that 
Geometric pot painters are not simply 
‘bad’ at representing the human body. It is 
not that they have a conception of the 
body, but lack the artistic means of 
representing it in a convincing way (as 
later Classical pot painters were to do). 
Geometric painters lack a conception of a 
body as a whole, and with it a conception 
of the self as a whole. So, on this tripod 
stand from the Athenian Kerameikos, 
bodies are represented as being identical 
with shields, whether round or ‘figure of 
eight’; and on the Agora oinochoe, there is  
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no clear distinction between the bodies of 
these ‘Siamese twins’ (if that is what they 
are) and their cuirass or armour. Warriors 
(or heroes) perhaps are not wholes, but a 
bit of a shield attached to a spear attached 
to a helmet.  
Snell was not alone. In a similar 
vein the Irish (if Oxford-based) scholar 
E.R. Dodds (1951, 1-27) explored the 
tendency of Homeric heroes to place moral 
responsibility for actions (or at least 
actions that go badly wrong) not on 
themselves but on outside agents. When 
Agamemnon apologises to Achilles for 
seizing Briseis (the action that provokes 
the ‘wrath of Achilles’, which is the main 
motor of the plot of the Iliad), he claims 
that it wasn’t him, it was this ate 
[madness] sent to me from Zeus that made 
him do it (Iliad. 19.86-90). 
  Now this school of thought – the idea 
that, in the world of Homer, there was no 
unified sense of either the body (soma) or 
the self – remains controversial. In one 
sense it seems to defy common sense. For 
both major poems have protagonists – 
heroes in the full sense of the term – and it 
is these heroes who form the subject of the 
poem, Achilles for the Iliad, and Odysseus 
for the Odyssey. But it would, I think, be a 
mistake to see them as protagonists in the 
modern sense of an individual whose 
character and whose choices drive the plot 
of a novel. The poems are not novels, and 
certainly not ones where individual 
character is what matters. Looked at in 
another way, it is not Achilles so much as 
his wrath – µηνινΑχιλλεωςαειδω–‘I sing of 
the wrath of Achilles’ (Iliad 1.1) – that the 
poet sings about; and it is both his wrath 
and his desire for kleos (fame, or the desire 
for fame) that drives the plot. Similarly, 
Odysseus does not achieve his return to 
Ithaca through the strength of his character 
or through an act of will. True, he is 
‘polymetis’, of many wiles, but the plot of 
the Odyssey makes it clear that he 
wouldn’t have got back there without the 
goddess Athena’s constant interference on 
his behalf. In one sense it is not the heroes 
but the gods who are the true moral agents 
in both poems – they make the decisions, 
and responsibility for outcomes (insofar as 
such a thing exists) resides with them. In 
another sense it is kleos (fame) and menis 
(wrath) that drive the poem forward, and 
these qualities attach themselves as much 
to things as to persons – (this is what I 
want to explore below).  
This fact is troubling to modern 
readers, who want to read both poems as if 
they were nineteenth-century novels 
written by an identifiable author like 
Tolstoy or George Eliot. Modern literary 
critics such as Harold Bloom (e.g. Bloom 
1995) may esteem Homer, but invariably 
place him lower in their canon than 
Shakespeare or Tolstoy precisely because 
Homer’s heroes appear to be less 
individual than (say) Shakespeare’s. 
Bloom believes that ‘the individual self is 
the only method and the whole standard 
for apprehending aesthetic value’(Bloom 
1995, 23) and in such a Romantic 
framework Homer’s lack of emphasis on 
the individual, and the individual’s will 
and agency, cannot be to the poet’s credit. 
For Bloom (referencing Dodds, Snell and 
Fraenkel) ‘Achilles, the best of the 
Achaeans, is essentially childlike 
[emphasis mine], because there is no 
integration of his intellect, his emotions 
and his sense impressions (Bloom 1995, 
208). This I think mis-represents both 
Dodd and Snell. While it is true that both 
Dodd’s view and Snell’s view seem very 
much at odds with the idea that Homeric 
heroes could approximate modern 
individuals (whether real or literary) they 
are not saying that Homeric heroes are 
children. This is a modernist or aesthetic 
misreading of their arguments, and one 
that takes no account of differences in 
personhood. It is true however that their 
arguments seem to imply that Homeric 
heroes could not be the locus of individual 
responsibility and moral agency, and it is 
this that has vexed other modern 
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interpreters – in this case modern 
philosophers. In his 1993 Sather lectures 
Shame and Necessity Bernard Williams 
(1993) argued strenuously that these 
peculiarities of Homeric speech are just 
that – façons de parler no more. The 
Homeric self, the Homeric individual is for 
Williams not substantially different from 
the modern one. Homer, and his heroes, 
has (implicitly) a sense of self, a self 
which remains the locus of moral 
responsibility and moral agency. Of 
course, Williams has to argue this way. 
The twin projects of humanism and 
secularism – the Enlightenment project – 
depend on there being individuals, morally 
autonomous persons capable of assessing 
beliefs in an objective and rational fashion, 
and so gradually coming to reject all 
superstitions (i.e. religions). Individualism 
is a condition of modernity. Those who 
cannot become, or do not consider 
themselves to be, individuals (like Orhan 
Pamuk’s Blue) are locked out of 
Modernity, and it is perhaps therefore not a 
surprise that they cling to ‘Religion’.  
Here I must put down my cards. I 
agree with Dodds and Snell, and so 
disagree not only with Williams and 
Bloom but also with the current consensus 
within Homeric literary scholarship (e.g. 
Finkelberg 2012). Homeric heroes and 
speakers are not individuals, in the 
modern, Euro-American sense. 
Contemporary personhood (sensu Fowler 
2004; 2010) and Homeric personhood are 
quite different. Moreover, not only are 
modern forms of personhood absent in 
Homer, so are particular kinds of agency 
(sensu Gell 1998). Homer’s heroes do not 
treat things as (we imagine) we do, as 
inanimate and disentangled from the 
everyday. Homeric material entanglements 
are quite distinct from those entailed by 
the requirements of contemporary 
individualism. But to explain this I will 
have to go far, far away from both Boris 
Johnson and the Iron Age Mediterranean.  
 
Homer’s Heroes: From Melanesia to Iron 
Age Greece 
 
In the early twentieth century 
anthropologists noticed that the 
mechanisms for the exchange of goods in 
the region of Papua New Guinea were 
quite different from what one would 
expect. There was an expectation, derived 
from evolutionary theory, that what one 
encounters in ‘primitive’ society is a form 
of barter, and that barter eventually leads 
to forms of exchange closer to the use of 
money to obtain commodities. These were 
regarded as the most efficient mechanisms 
for providing human needs. Instead what 
anthropologists such as Malinowski 
encountered in these regions was 
something that came to be known as gift 
exchange – later theorised for us by 
Marcel Mauss (1954). In the classic kula 
system of the Trobriand Islands goods did 
not simply move, but went in a circle 
(Malinowski 1922). More peculiarly, some 
of these goods kept on coming back over 
long cycles – clearly they were not 
fulfilling some economic need, narrowly 
defined. In the course of these cycles, 
these objects acquired ‘biographies’, 
associations with particular named 
persons. 
One might have expected such a 
‘primitive’ system to wither in the face of 
modernity. Melanesians would abandon 
their strange ways (perhaps with the help 
of the many Business Schools which 
sprung up in Western universities) and 
move to a commodity-based economy. It 
then surprised many anthropologists, 
revisiting these areas in the 1970s and 
1980s, that this transition had not taken 
place (Leach and Leach 1983). The 
kularing remained as vigorous as ever. 
This fact prompted researchers to look a 
little closer at what things were exchanged 
and how. One thing that they found was 
that the relationship between people and 
things – what has recently come to be 
termed ‘material entanglements’ or 
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‘human-thing entanglements’ (Hodder 
2011) – bears more than a passing 
similarity to descriptions of Homeric 
objects. Weiner  (1992) for example, in 
arguing that objects within the kula ring 
and elsewhere in Melanesia and Polynesia, 
were never truly given away – that they 
always retained the associations of their 
previous owners – could not refrain from 
quoting lines of Homer where the same 
idea seems to apply. Munn (1986), in her 
more detailed re-examination of the kula 
ring, compared the quality that attached to 
objects butu [fame] to Homeric kleos. In 
her re-appraisal, objects not people became 
the subjects of fame songs (Munn 1986, 
292 n.14). It was these observations – the 
idea that objects always remain attached to 
all the owners in the exchange cycle, and 
that they are never truly given away – that 
led in part to the notion of the ‘dividual’. 
These notions were further extended in 
Nicholas Thomas’ (1991) Entangled 
Objects (where objects move from the gift 
to the commodity sphere and back again, 
and become entangled with the social lives 
of different cultures, and indeed mediate 
encounters between them), and Alfred 
Gell’s (1998) notion of agency (where it is 
the object as much as the person which is 
endowed with animism) and of the 
distributed person.  
Here I come to the nub of my 
argument. In Homer agency and 
personhood are closely connected and 
Homer’s heroes have much more in 
common with that anthropological entity, 
the ‘dividual’ than they do with modern 
individuals (at least as conceived by 
philosophers such as Williams).  Homer’s 
protagonists, like Melanesian dividuals, 
act within complex reciprocities of gender 
and artefacts. Like ‘ethnographic’ 
Melanesians and Polynesians, Homeric 
heroes are entangled with particular 
objects with extended biographies. 
Examples are many (Grethlein 
2008). They include Agamemnon’s 
sceptre, which provides legitimation for 
his claim to rule over all the Achaeans at 
Troy (Iliad 2. 180-88).  Another example 
particularly pertinent to my argument is 
the exchange between Odysseus and 
Meriones (Il. 10.260-271; see Hainsworth 
1993, 178-181), in which Odysseus is 
given a helmet made from boars’ tusks. 
This helmet has quite an elaborate 
backstory, or biography: it was given to 
Odysseus by Meriones, who was given it 
by Molos, who was given it by 
Amphidamas, who in turn was given it by 
Autolykos, who took it from Amyntor. In 
this way, the helmet travels from Eleon (in 
Boeotia), to Kythera, to Crete, to Troy and 
(perhaps) Ithaka (see Borchhardt 1972, 81 
fig. 7). The description is full enough (and 
the object itself sufficiently unusual) for 
there to be no doubt that it refers to a type 
of helmet that turns up in tombs, first on 
the Greek mainland in the area around 
Mycenae, and then in Crete, in the Late 
Bronze Age between 1500 to1200 BC.  
Indeed, for Homeric scholars it remains 
the only artefact whose description places 
it firmly in the Bronze and not the Iron 
Age. While the artefact type does certainly 
originate in the Late Bronze Age, the form 
of material entanglement this description 
represents must belong to a later period, to 
the very end of the Bronze Age and the 
beginning of the Iron Age. Indeed, the 
boar’s tusk helmet is one of a range of 
antiques whose exotic origin, context and 
deposition illustrates precisely such 
‘material entanglements’, which can be 
dated fairly confidently to the period 1150-
900 BC (that is, the beginning of the Iron 
Age).  
This is not because most examples 
of this helmet are of Iron Age date – most 
are Bronze Age. There are however two 
chronological and geographical outliers, 
one in Achaea (which need not detain us 
here), and one from Knossos. This was 
found in tomb 201, dated from its 
associated finds to around 1150-1100 BC 
(Coldstream and Catling 1996, 191-5). It is 
therefore an antique, and in this sense 
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better fits with Homer’s description than 
earlier examples. This and other objects 
were found with a number of other 
antiques in one of the earliest examples of 
a male ‘warrior’ cremation burial to be 
found in the Early Iron Age. When Hector 
Catling (Catling 1995) first published parts 
of this grave he argued that this kind of 
burial represented one of the real heroes 
returned from the Trojan War. This is not 
quite as foolish as it seems. The male body 
of the ‘warrior’, accompanied by bronze 
weapons, was thoroughly burnt in a 
manner that recalls the cremation of both 
Patroklos and Hector in the Iliad (23.161-
257; 24.782-804). And it was not only the 
body that was burnt – with him was the 
‘ruin’ (Hector Catling’s words; Catling 
1996, 517-8; cf Pappasavvas 2001, 82-4 
and 241-2 no. 26) of a Cypriot bronze 
four-sided stand. Like the boar’s tusk 
helmet, this too must have been an antique 
at the time of its deposition.  
The Cypriot four-sided stand, 
though clearly an antique, is not mentioned 
in Homer.  It does however turn up in the 
literature of another East Mediterranean 
people whose Iron Age achievements are 
still with us. In the Book of Kings (Kings 
1.7.27-39) such stands (cf Pappasavvas 
2001, 146-9) are part of the cult equipment 
of the Temple of Solomon, where their 
manufacture is ascribed to Hiram of Tyre. 
The way they are described forms an 
interesting contrast to Homeric description 
(Whitley 2013, 399-402). While Homeric 
descriptions are either biographical 
(describing the various associations that 
have accumulated to the object through its 
passage through various owners), or 
ekphrastic (where the description of the 
object provides an occasion for a narrative 
within a narrative), the description of these 
stands is rigorously factual, with great 
attention paid to the object’s size and 
weight. The ancient Hebrews, it seems, 
were not interested in biographical objects.  
To return to tomb 201:  it has been argued 
(Whitley 2000; 2002) that this form of 
ostentatious destruction of male bodies in 
association with weapons and antiques, 
antiques which had by this time acquired 
quite an extensive object biography, is part 
of a new form both of material 
entanglement or personhood. It represents 
a form of ‘human-thing entanglement’ 
(sensu Hodder 2011) that is not to be 
found in the Bronze Age. It is moreover 
agendered form of ‘human-thing 
entanglement’– it is males (in the first 
instance) who are treated to this form of 
ostentatious destruction in death, and 
(generally) not females or children. 
Certainly, the warrior grave cremation 
becomes characteristic of many (but not 
all) Aegean communities in the middle of 
the Early Iron Age around 900 BC, 
particularly in Athens (D’Onofrio 2011). 
This gendered polarity can be seen at its 
starkest in this double burial, the ‘hero’s 
grave’ from Lefkandi, where the cremated 
remains of a male warrior with a broken 
iron sword are accompanied by a rich 
female inhumation (Popham et al. 1993, 
17-22). Here the cremated remains of a 
warrior are interred in another Cypriot 
antique, a bronze amphoroidkrater (Catling 
1993; cf. Catling 1964, 156-61; 1984). The 
shape is, in a sense, ambiguous. On the 
one hand it is a krater, for mixing water 
with wine as the centrepiece of some 
drinking practice that must be the ancestor 
of the Classical symposium. The 
biographies of such kraters (silver ones) 
are described in detail on two occasions in 
the Homeric poems: once when this krater 
is given as a prize for the funeral games of 
Patroklos (Iliad 23.740-9), and once in the 
Odyssey when Telemachus receives a 
similar parting gift (with a slightly less 
elaborate biography) from Menelaus 
(Odyssey 4: 613-9; 15. 113-19).  On the 
other hand it is an amphora, and could 
conceivably have been called a phiale, the 
vessel used to inter the ashes of Patroklos 
(Iliad 23.243 and 253) and the one object 
that links the narratives of both Homeric 
epics, in that it was used finally to inter the 
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cremated remains of Achilles too (Odyssey 
24.74; see Burgess 2009).  
All this is to say that the material 
entanglements we see in Homer – the way 
that the kraters and helmets are exchanged 
amongst peers, but exchanged in such a 
way that they never quite lose their 
associations with their previous owners – 
have much more in common with 
Melanesia than with modernity. Nor are 
such entanglements necessarily 
characteristic of all the peoples of the Iron 
Age Mediterranean, as the very matter-of-
fact descriptions of Hiram’s stands shows. 
These observations have other implications 
however. We need to look at the narrative 
role of objects in both epics, and the wider 
implications for our understanding of the 
process of their composition.  
 
How do we date the poems? 
 
Thirty or even twenty years ago the 
general consensus about the Homeric 
poems was that they were composed 
around 700 BC. They were the earliest 
poems in Greek, and the start of Western 
literature.  Images such as the one on a mid 
7th century BC Protoattic amphora from 
Eleusis showing the blinding of 
Polyphemos were held to provide a clear 
terminus ante quem for the composition of 
the Odyssey (see Snodgrass 1998). As the 
Odyssey was generally held to be later than 
the Iliad, then these images provided a 
date for that too (see Wade-Gery 1952). 
This consensus held for a very long 
time – as late as 1986 (e.g. Morris 1986) 
the date of circa 700 BC for the 
composition of the Homeric poemswas 
held to be ‘something that everyone 
knew’. Indeed, so firm was this consensus 
that Barry Powell (1991) could use it as a 
datum for his revival of Wade-Gery’s 
(1952) suggestion that the Greek alphabet 
(with vowels) was invented specifically to 
transcribe the text of Homer’s Iliad. This 
consensus has however now broken down. 
Many scholars still adhere to the date of 
circa 700 BC (e.g. Ulf 2009; Raaflaub 
1998), but many do not. The Harvard 
scholar Gregory Nagy (1997) has proposed 
quite a different model for the composition 
of the Homeric poems that suggests that 
they did not reach any kind of written form 
until around 550 BC.  One of the reasons 
for this shift in view was a re-
consideration of the iconographic 
evidence. For one thing, these mid 7th 
century images of the blinding of 
Polyphemos are a bit of a one off 
(Snodgrass 1998). There are no clear 
images that derive from either poem in the 
late 7th or early 6th centuries BC. Indeed, 
while images from the Epic Cycle and the 
Trojan War are quite common on black 
and red figure vases of the sixth century, 
images that clearly derive from an 
authoritative text of either of the Homeric 
poems are far less common. So we get 
images from other poems in the Epic 
Cycle, such as the Ilioupersis (the Fall of 
Troy) but few from either Iliad or Odyssey. 
Where we have scenes that seem to relate 
to either poem, it seems to be a version 
which is non-canonical: in funeral games 
of Patroklos on the François vase from 
Chiusi/ Clusim (see Beazley 1986, 24-34), 
datable to around 560 BC, the dramatis 
personae are not those given in Iliad 
23.261-538; similarly the depiction of 
‘Sleep and Death carrying away Sarpedon’ 
on the Euphronioskrater from Cerverteri, 
once in New York (Boardman 1975, 33, 
frontispiece and fig. 22) is hardly a direct, 
visual transcription of Iliad 16.676-83 
(Whitley 2012, 586-87), since in our text 
of the Iliad it is Apollo, not Hermes who is 
sent. Only around 480 BC do we have 
scenes which unambiguously derive from 
a near canonical text, as on a stamnos by 
the Siren painter showing Odysseus and 
the Sirens (British Museum GR 
1843.1103,31 from Vulci). Indeed, one 
could argue that the first scene on a Greek 
vase that derives unambiguously from the 
text of Homer is this scene on a vase by the 
Brygos painter in Vienna, which shows 
14	   [	  STUDIES	  IN	  HISTORY,	  ARCHAEOLOGY,	  RELIGION	  AND	  CONSERVATION]	  
	  
	   	   	  
Priam pleading with Achilles for the body 
of his son Hector (Iliad 24.469-84). 
What does remain constant 
however is the importance of things, of 
objects, within the poem, or rather the Epic 
Cycle as a whole – as in the image of 
Thetis giving Achilles his original divine 
armour found on an amphora from Orvieto 
painted by the Amasis painter now in 
Boston (Boston 01.8027; Beazley 1986, 
152 no. 27). The German scholar Jonas 
Grethlein (2008) has recently explored the 
role of objects, and of objects, which carry 
memories of the past, in the poems. 
Looked at in this way, the original arms of 
Achilles form one of the main 
protagonists, or agents, within the Iliad 
(Iliad 17. 194-7; 18.84-5; 22.322-3; cf 
Whitley 2013, 399). When Achilles sulks 
they go out of commission. He then lends 
them to Patroklos in book 16, armour 
which contributes to Patroklos’ temporary 
success. They are then taken by Hector, 
and fought over again by Achilles. The 
object is a pivotal agent in the plot.  
Does this then provide a good 
reason for supposing that, in general, 
Homer’s heroes have more to do with 
Melanesia than Modernity? Well, up to a 
point. It depends on whether you believe in 
what might be called the theory of the 
individual – that the notion of individual 
provides an adequate and convincing 
account of the modern, Euro-American 
sense of self. Here I think juridico-political 
notions of individual responsibility and 
autonomy are at odds with the stories that 
modern people read and tell about 
themselves.  
 
Entanglements Ancient and Modern 
 
Homeric entanglements turn up in 
surprising places. Objects acting as agents, 
as dramatis personae, within a narrative, 
even ‘literary’ novels that assume some 
notion of individuality and autonomy. 
They are, of course, much more common 
in derided genre fiction (crime fiction, 
science fiction and fantasy). Moving a 
little closer to Boris Johnson and twenty-
first century London is early twentieth-
century Dublin, where this exchange (both 
verbal and material) is alleged to have 
taken place in a public house on the 16th 
June 1904. 
 
‘Then did you, chivalrous Terence, 
hand forth, as to the manor born, that 
nectarous beverage and you offered the 
crystal cup to him that thirsted, the soul of 
chivalry, in beauty akin to the immortals’ 
 
‘But he, the young chief of the 
O’Bergan’s, could ill brook to be outdone 
in generous deeds but gave therefore with 
gracious gesture a testoon of costliest 
bronze. Thereon embossed in excellent 
smithwork was seen the image of a queen 
of regal port, scion of the house of 
Brunswick, Victoria her name, Her Most 
Excellent Majesty, by grace of God of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland and of the British dominions 
beyond the sea, queen, defender of the 
faith, Empress of India, even she, who 
bore rule, a victress over many peoples, 
the wellbeloved, for they knew and loved 
her from the rising of the sun to the going 
done thereof, the pale, the dark, the ruddy 
and the ethiop’ 
 
 Here we have returned to Polyphemos 
cave, to which our protagonist Boris was 
alluding when he quoted that passage in 
the Odyssey.  
The cave here is a public house, 
our Odysseus is Mr Leopold Bloom, and 
our Polyphemos the one-eyed Irish 
nationalist the Citizen (Joyce 1960, 387). 
In this deliberately over-elaborate 
description an exchange of commodities 
has been turned into that classic 
Homeric/Melanesian trope, an exchange of 
gifts. But this is more than a good Irish 
joke about paying a penny for a pint. The 
objects concerned are, in many ways, over-
determined. The power of the British 
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Empire is inscribed on the penny; the pint 
stands for a certain kind of Irish nativism. 
There is some serious politics here.  
Is there then some serious politics 
in Boris Johnson’s seemingly jovial quote? 
I would say that there is more going on 
than Boris’ trying to impress a journalist, 
or demonstrating that he has ‘Hinterland’. 
Inadvertently, he is raising a dilemma that 
troubles all politicians. The Conservative 
party to which he belongs has never quite 
managed to make up its mind about how 
much it should value institutions, and so a 
sense of belonging to institutions, and how 
much it should let rip with American-style 
individualism. These issues can be seen as 
issues of personhood. Is our being, our 
sense of self, tied up with other people, 
other things, or other institutions? If so we 
are ‘dividuals’ rather than individuals. Or 
are we truly autonomous individuals, 
operating within a society and a market 
that is entirely free, and so the authors of 
our ‘free’ choices? These issues remain 
unresolved in Boris as in any other of our 
major politicians (of whatever party). 
Boris does not really know whether he is 
or should be an individual, or a dividual 
who is part of a wider whole, and whose 
parts reside somehow elsewhere. We are 
perhaps far less modern than we think. 
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